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Prob lems of Stra te gic Planning of
Pres i den tial Cam paign*
Be fore Pres i den tial elec tions, the prob lem of abil ity of Ukrai nian elec -
toral tech nol o gies spe cial ists to plan and con duct a large-scale (for ex -
am ple, pres i den tial) and com pli cated elec tion cam paign in de pend ently
and com pletely was brought up more and more of ten.
Yulija Mostova, Ed i tor of “Zerkalo Nedeli”, stressed this prob lem in
one of her ar ti cles in the news-pa per. An a lyzing the prob lem of hir ing
Rus sian spe cial ists for or ga niz ing a pres i den tial cam paign in Ukraine,
she em pha sized: “… We must face the truth and ac cept that, in Ukraine,
one can not choose among PR agen cies, be cause such agen cies, as well
as ex pe ri enced im age-mak ers, are ab sent. On the Internet, ‘The Agency
of Po lit i cal News’ rated 20 Rus sian com pa nies that have been suc cess ful 
in this sphere; such rat ing is im pos si ble in Ukraine. The ab sence of
bright and out-of-or di nary ac tions in pres i den tial cam paigns of ev ery
sin gle can di date proves this” [1].
In deed, Rus sia’s sev eral doz ens of openly work ing (with out re veal ing
de tails of their ac tiv ity and their ‘know-how’ tech nol o gies, of course) po -
lit i cal PR agen cies makes Rus sian sit u a tion much more pos i tive than
that in Ukraine.
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Trans lated by Tetyana Gerasimenko.
Edited by Svitlana Ivashchenko
Firstly, pol i ti cians and par ties will ing to use such ser vices can turn
down pro pos als of po lit i cal char la tans and, in stead, en joy full-scale
elec toral ser vices from se ri ous agen cies.
Sec ondly, so ci ol o gists, po lit i cal sci en tists, and PR work ers em ployed
in such or ga ni za tions aren’t ‘ashamed’ of their pro fes sion and aren’t
afraid of ac cu sa tions of serv ing the ‘in sid i ous pol i tics’, even when they
have to use con fi den tial in for ma tion, which is un avoid able in this
sphere. When con duct ing ‘closed’ or spe cial im age re search, they can be
per fectly sure that their work’s ob jec tiv ity and com pli ance with pro fes -
sional codes would be ver i fied.
Finally, this ap proach al lows pub lic to con trol main pa ram e ters of
such re search and its level of ac cu racy; it al lows pub lic to know what or -
ga ni za tions con duct a re search and work for a spe cific can di date; it re -
veals meth ods used in re search, etc. (all this does n’t ap pear un nec es -
sary af ter the Kyiv Mayor elec tion cam paign).
Now, let’s re vert to the sit u a tion on the Ukrai nian mar ket of PR ser -
vices and elec tion tech nol o gies. Here, we re ally fall be hind the Rus sians.
The only ques tion is why? Relying on our ex pe ri ence, we an a lyzed the
prac tice of or ga niz ing elec tion cam paigns in Ukraine and found two
main (in our opin ion) rea sons:
a. Our so ci ol o gists, politologists, psy chol o gists, un like Rus sian
ones, are very slow and in de ci sive in adopt ing ‘po lit i cal-tech no log -
i cal’ ap proaches; at the same time, they ac cept full re spon si bil ity
for or ga niz ing elec tions. State ments of lead ing Ukrai nian so cio -
log i cal agen cies sound pathetical: “Un for tu nately, we can not give
any prom ises; we can just say that if elec tions were con ducted to -
day and if we had high voter turn out…” Still, as so ci ol o gists, we
aren’t try ing to mock at our selves and our col leagues. On the con -
trary, all we’re say ing is that elec tions should be or ga nized not by
any so ci ol o gists or any politologists, but by pro fes sional PR
teams; by the way, all around the globe, such teams con sist of so ci -
ol o gists, politologists, or psy chol o gists. Ev ery where, in clud ing
Rus sia, these teams re ally ac cept re spon si bil ity for elec tion re -
sults, de spite the fact that even the most fa mous of them, such as
the Amer i can com pany “Whitaker and Beckster”, are suc cess ful
in only 70% to 80% of cases.
b. Ukrai nian pol i ti cians, es pe cially the big ones, suf fer from an ‘in fe -
ri or ity’ com plex when en gag ing PR spe cial ists in their elec tion
cam paigns. Of course, this does n’t ap ply to ev ery pol i ti cian: for ex -
am ple, one of this ar ti cle’s au thors used only Ukrai nian spe cial -
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ists in elec tions. How ever, in most cases, our lead ing pol i ti cians re -
quest help from Mos cow with out even try ing to find lo cal spe cial -
ists, with out priorly con duct ing any ten der. Here, we won’t dis cuss 
the ac tual com pe tence of spe cial ists from in vited Rus sian teams.
Nei ther we will dis cuss the depth of their knowl edge of Ukrai nian
po lit i cal re al ity. Still, we want to men tion that Rus sian pol i ti cians
pos sess ing suf fi cient fi nan cial re sources, sel dom in vite PR spe -
cial ists from the US or any other ‘non-So viet’ for eign coun try for
con duct ing their own elec tion cam paigns. In other words, does
Ukraine have spe cial ists able to or ga nize an ef fec tive elec tion cam -
paign?
A thought-out and stip u lated an swer to this ques tion is ‘yes’. Our
state ment is based on an a lyz ing the or ga ni za tion of the lat est Verkhovna 
Rada (Su preme Coun cil) elec tion cam paigns – most can di dates em -
ployed Ukrai nian teams. One could ob serve some cases of very ef fec tive
work. The ques tion is: how many such teams and spe cial ists are there?
Be cause their work in Ukraine can be de scribed as highly spe cific and
semi-un der cover, we can hardly hope to give a pre cise an swer to this
ques tion. In ei ther case, the time has come to make teams of our Ukrai -
nian spe cial ists vis i ble: they need to ap pear on the Internet, to con duct
spe cial con fer ences, and to com pete on the mar ket of PR ser vices and
elec tion tech nol o gies.
It is our be lief that we al ready have teams ready to take part in con -
duct ing elec tion cam paigns, even pres i den tial ones, if they are put to
work. Qual ity of their work will be come ev i dent some time later, be cause
only their prac ti cal ac tiv ity can nat u rally show just how suc cess ful they
are. Only pol i tics and elec tions will show the truth.
* * *
We’ll re veal some stra te gic el e ments of the 1999 Ukrai nian pres i den -
tial cam paign that was con ducted for one of dem o crat i cally-ori ented
pres i den tial can di dates by a team of spe cial ists from the Cen ter of So cio -
log i cal and Po lit i cal Re search and Tech nol ogies “Sociopolis”; the team
was headed by the au thors of this ar ti cle.
We’ll ig nore such prob lems as cam paign fi nanc ing, elec tion head -
quar ters or ga ni za tions, work of teams, etc. We’ll only dis cuss the ‘cre -
ative’ as pect of de sign ing an elec tion cam paign strat egy. This as pect in -
cludes clar i fy ing and work ing out the fol low ing items:
— choos ing a gen eral strat egy, an elec tion cam paign par a digm, and
the main course of the cam paign;
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— find ing a key prob lem (prob lems) of the cam paign;
— de cid ing the goals and tasks of the cam paign;
— re veal ing and us ing ‘tar get’ elec tor ate groups in the course of the
cam paign;
— de sign ing the main slo gans of the cam paign;
— se lect ing par ties and pub lic or ga ni za tions which can back up a
can di date or those he as so ci ates with;
— de vel op ing a can di date’s po si tions and find ing ways to im prove his
im age and to de crease that of his main op po nents;
— clar i fy ing a can di date’s pro pa ganda (po lit i cal ad ver tis ing) strat e -
gies;
— choos ing the main courses of coun ter-pro pa ganda.
Be cause of the ex clu sive ness of the de vel oped strat egy and the pres -
ence of ‘know-how’ (elec toral tech nol o gies) in the orig i nal doc u ment, it is 
pos si ble to re veal only some of its items in this ar ti cle. Still, it ap pears
that they can help us un der stand whether Ukrai nian spe cial ists can be
ef fec tive on the mar ket of PR ser vices.
Choosing a gen eral strat egy
for an elec tion cam paign
Ukrai nian and in ter na tional ex pe ri ence shows that in choos ing a
gen eral strat egy for elec tion cam paign (in clud ing pres i den tial ones),
there is a num ber of se ri ous prob lems that should be dealt with be fore
find ing a key prob lem and goals of the cam paign [2]. These are:
— ‘can di date, pro gram or party’;
— ‘in te gra tion or dis in te gra tion’;
— ‘pref er ence scale’ (or party scale).
Let’s dis cuss them from the stand point of the main course of the cam -
paign (as you re mem ber, our strat egy was de vel oped for one of dem o crat -
i cally ori ented can di dates) and of ma te ri als we pos sess, in clud ing data
of so cio log i cal mon i tor ing re search.
‘Can di date, pro gram or party’. Task of solv ing this prob lem is of ut -
most sig nif i cance in choos ing a strat egy for elec tion cam paign. To do so,
we need to de ter mine who or what en joys the larg est sup port of elec tor -
ate and pub lic opin ion in the elec tion cam paign pe riod: is it a can di date
for which the elec tion cam paign is con ducted, or a pro gram that he pres -
ents to vot ers, or is it a party he be longs to or claims to as so ci ate with.
Clar ifying this is sue helps us find the main ac cent for an elec tion cam -
paign. 
92 Ukrai nian So cio log i cal Re view, 1998–1999
Volodymyr Poltorak, Oleh Petrov
In coun tries with a formed dem o cratic sys tem, this prob lem can be
solved in dif fer ent ways, de pend ing on a num ber of cir cum stances, in -
clud ing the men tal ity of vot ers. Thus, in the US, as Amer i can so ci ol o -
gists’ re searches, a voter pri mar ily bases his/her elec toral de ci sions on
his/her as sess ment of a can di date’s per son al ity; the po lit i cal pro gram is 
on the third place; the party af fil i a tion is on the fifth place. The sit u a tion
in Ger many is com pletely dif fer ent: there, pub lic mostly votes for a party.
When it co mes to se lect ing the best dem o crat i cally ori ented can di -
date in the last Ukrai nian pres i den tial elec tions, there has been many
op tions to choose from (see Ta ble 1).
Ta ble 1
The per cent age of sup port ers of dif fer ent po lit i cal par ties
among the pop u la tion of Ukraine,
% of re spon dents
Po lit i cal par ties De cem ber,1998
July,
1999
Agrar ian Party of Ukraine 2 1
The All-Ukrai nian Com mu nity “Gromada” 2 1
The Com mu nist Party of Ukraine (CPU) 18 18
Peo ple’s Move ment of Ukraine (RUKH) (H.Udovenko)
8
4
RUKH (Yu.Kostenko) 1
Peo ple’s Dem o cratic Party 5 5
The Greens’ Party of Ukraine 6 2
“Re forms and Or der” Party 4 1
The Ru ral Party of Ukraine 2 1
The Pro gres sive So cial ist Party of Ukraine 3 3
The So cial-Dem o cratic Party of Ukraine  4 3
So cial ist Party of Ukraine 3 3
Other 1 1
None 34 49
Ta ble 1 shows that only P.Symonenko (CPU) could fully rely (which he
did) on elec tor ate loyal to his party; other pres i den tial can di dates, in -
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clud ing left can di dates, were very lim ited in this sense (it’s note wor thy
that po lit i cal strat i fi ca tion of elec tor ate some what clar i fied be fore the
last par lia men tary elec tions, was slowly fad ing with time gone by).
As for the ‘can di date or pro gram’ di lemma, our stud ies showed that
Ukrai nian elec tor ate pays more at ten tion to can di dates, al though not al -
ways. When asked which of the two qual i ties of a pres i den tial can di date
is more im por tant for a po ten tial voter, con tent of his pro gram or his per -
sonal qual i ties, 49% of re spon dents chose per sonal qual i ties and 41% — 
the con tent of his pro gram (10% were hes i tant).
For cit i zens, the con cept of ideal can di date is pretty con tro ver sial:
just like in a fa mous M.Gogol’s novel, peo ple want him to have ‘ev ery -
thing’ and ev ery thing to be the best. In re spon dent’s point of view, a pres -
i den tial can di date should be a po lit i cal party leader and/or a high gov -
ern ment ex ec u tive. Pri marily, he must be able to make cor rect and ef fec -
tive de ci sions (sure, peo ple don’t have a spe cific method of an a lyz ing the
ef fec tive ness of de ci sions, but the ef fec tive ness of the pres ent ex ec u tive
branch is the same as the sit u a tion in the coun try); he must be rea son -
ably young (no older than 50-55); his speech must be well-rea soned and
con vinc ing; he must sup port the ac cel er a tion of mar ket re forms and
bring the coun try to an ‘iron-firm’ or der; he must ad vo cate a Rus sian-
 Ukrai nian uni fi ca tion. It is less de sir able for him to be long to pres -
ent-day gov ern ment struc tures. It must be a pol i ti cian able to op pose
con ser va tive forces and old no men cla ture; he must have a clear re form
ide ol ogy.
Re sults of our stud ies (see Ta ble 2) show that it’s al most im pos si ble to 
find a can di date with a full set of qual i ties listed above: some are young,
but have nei ther ex pe ri ence, nor re al is tic chances to win; oth ers are
more ex pe ri enced and more ‘fit ting’, but they are older and rep re sent
‘weak’ par ties or even de clare them selves in de pend ent can di dates. So,
there is not only a prob lem of choos ing the best can di date, but also a
prob lem of de vel op ing an op ti mal ver sion of elec toral pro gram. Here, we
face a very se ri ous prob lem. For most part, can di dates’ pro grams con sist 
of ba sis and situative el e ments. Ba sis el e ments re veal a can di date’s po -
lit i cal, eco nom i cal, and so cial in ten tions (for ex am ple, his at ti tude to
mar ket re forms, or to the Rus sia-Belarus un ion, etc.). Situative el e -
ments (peo ple of ten pay more at ten tion to those) con sist of giv ing some
prom ises, ex plain ing tac ti cal plans of solv ing the most ur gent prob lems.
As for the sec ond, situative part of a can di date’s pro gram, those prob -
lems, which, in re spon dents’ opin ion, are the most im por tant and ur -
gent, are shown in the Fig ure 1.
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Fig ure 1. The hi er ar chy of the main prob lems of Ukrai nian so ci ety,
which worry pop u la tion the most; % of re spon dents; July 1999.
The study did n’t re veal any thing un ex pected. Still, the fact, that the
is sue of pay ment of sal a ries and pen sions be came the num ber one prob -
lem among all the most com pli cated pres ent-day so cial prob lems, is sig -
nif i cant. It was ob vi ous, that can di dates who were pres ently in volved in
gov ern ment, in cur rent sit u a tion, could not re al is ti cally ex pect a suc -
cess, un less debts would be paid out be fore the elec tions (let’s re mem ber
Livshits mov ing mark ers of debt can cel la tion across re gions be fore
B.Yeltsin’s vic tory) and an item strictly for bid ding de lays in pay ing sal a -
ries and pen sions would be in cluded into the pro gram. High prices of
pub lic util i ties and acute prob lems of med i cal ser vice should be also re -
mem bered. How ever, in de sign ing an elec tion cam paign strat egy, it is
more im por tant to re veal ba sis, that is, key in ten tions of dif fer ent can di -
dates. The prob lem is that vot ers aren’t likely to trust a can di date who
sud denly ex hib its some thing ex traor di nary that, in his opin ion, will
cause elec tor ate to sup port him. For most part, vot ers al ready have ex -
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pec ta tions about a con tent of a pro gram of a can di date. We stud ied ex -
actly what vot ers think about the con tent of reg is tered can di dates’ pro -
grams (un for tu nately, be cause of the com plex ity of in clud ing all can di -
dates in our study, we had to limit our selves to as sess ing the pro grams of
the cur rent Pres i dent and four left can di dates).
Ta ble 2
‘Elec tions Rat ing’ — the per cent age of re spon dents
who were to vote for spe cific pres i den tial can di dates
among those who were plan ning to vote. (The ques tion was: 
For which pres i den tial can di date would you vote to day?”)
Pres i den tial
Can di dates
De cem ber 1998
N=2198 
April 1999
N=2198
July 1999
N=2198
Vitrenko Natalija 11.9 21.5 19.5
Haber Mykola 0.2
Karmazin Yurij 0.2
Kononov Vitalij 0.2
Kostenko Yurij 0.7
Kravchuk Leonid 2.6
Kuchma Leonid 7.4 14.5 20.5
Lazarenko Pavlo 1.4
Marchuk Yevhen 3.5 5.7 5.2
Moroz Oleksandr 13.4 9.2 6.7
Olijnyk Volodymyr 0.4
Onopenko Vasyl 0.4
Pustovojtenko Valerij 6.0 4.4
Rzshavsky Oleksandr 0.2
Symonenko Petro 9.6 10.4 16.2
Tkachenko Oleksandr 1.1 2.9 2.1
Udovenko Hennadij 5.4 3.1
Chornovil Viacheslav 4.9
Yushchenko Vic tor 8.7
Note: Grayed-out cells sig nify that names of cor re spond ing pres i den tial can di dates were
not in cluded in a cor re spond ing poll.
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The ef fort to re flect pub lic per cep tion of pro grams of these can di dates
for a po si tion of the Pres i dent of Ukraine is shown in Ta ble 3.
Ta ble 3
Hi er ar chy of pos si ble ac tions that, in re spon dents’ opin ion,
some of pres i den tial can di dates will un der take for solv ing
ur gent prob lems, pro vided they get elected
(% of those re spon dents who were plan ning to vote; July 1999)
Ac tions, meth ods
Vitren -
ko
Kuch -
ma Moroz
Symo -
nenko
Tka -
chenko
Will con tinue rad i cal eco nomic
re forms and take past mis takes
into ac count
16 31 11 9 6
Will en sure the right of pri vate
prop erty own er ship
5 18 5 3 4
Will al low free land mar ket 3 14 3 1 3
Will sup port small and mid-size
busi nesses
9 20 8 5 6
Will stop sup port ing un prof it able 
or ga ni za tions
7 12 6 6 4
Will in crease the qual ity of life of
pop u la tion
23 15 13 18 8
Will re store help for low-in come
per sons and in crease pen sions
22 13 12 17 7
Will de crease taxes 16 11 11 12 6
Will give spe cial con sid er ation for 
prob lems of chil dren and youth
18 9 8 11 5
Will sup port cul ture, ed u ca tion,
and sci ence
12 10 8 9 5
Will stop an in crease in crim i nal
ac tiv ity
14 10 10 15 5
Will ac tively fight cor rup tion 19 10 11 16 5
Will in sist on obey ing the law 15 9 9 12 6
Will in dex peo ple’s bank ac -
counts and start pay ing out the
dif fer ence
11 6 7 10 4
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Will en sure for ti fy ing the coun -
try’s bor der and pre ven tion of
 il le gal ex port of fi nan cial re -
sources
10 8 8 9 5
Will re sume con trol of state over
the prices
16 6 10 17 8
Will aban don im i tat ing the 
West ern life style
10 2 8 15 8
Will re frain from re ceiv ing 
West ern fi nan cial sup port
9 1 5 12 6
Will stop pri vat iza tion 8 1 5 13 6
Will use se vere meth ods to stop
chaos in the coun try
9 4 4 11 4
Will put a ban on harm ful books
and mov ies
6 2 3 7 4
Will strictly con trol the sources 
of cit i zens’ in come
9 4 5 9 5
Will put a ban on em i gra tion
from the coun try
3 1 2 5 3
Will put a ban on strikes and
other forms of civil dis obe di ence
3 4 1 5 3
Will ban op po si tion par ties 
(or a set of par ties)
4 3 2 7 3
No re sponse 52 54 66 56 72
The word ing of the ques tion was: “What would a cer tain pol i ti cian do
in the first place if he is elected the Pres i dent of Ukraine?” Over a half of
re spon dents in all cases, that is, in cases of as sess ing dif fer ent can di -
dates, did n’t have clear un der stand ing of what main ac tions dif fer ent
can di dates in tend to im ple ment be ing elected the Pres i dent of Ukraine.
The sit u a tion is a lit tle better for three lead ing can di dates (L.Kuchma,
N.Vitrenko, P.Symonenko): most (over a half) of re spon dents were able to
name their main in ten tions; how ever, when it co mes to O.Moroz and, es -
pe cially, O.Tkachenko, vot ers ex hib ited lit tle un der stand ing of what
these pol i ti cians ‘want’. At the same time, re spon dents sel dom named
any clear, in ter est ing, and bright char ac ter is tics of these can di dates’
pro grams. There fore, it was im pos si ble to re con struct them ac cord ing to
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the po ten tial vot ers’ knowl edge. This must be the rea son why they fell be -
hind the other two left can di dates in the above rat ing.
L.KUCHMA PROGRAM’S IMAGE. From the re sults of the study, it is
ap par ent that the in cum bent Pres i dent will act in the di rec tion of in -
creas ing peo ple’s qual ity of life, in creas ing pen sions, and se vere strug gle 
with crimes, al though in these cat e go ries, he is be hind N.Vitrenko and
P.Symonenko. His most dis tinc tive in ten tions, how ever, in re spon dents’
opin ion, have to do with con tin u a tion of rad i cal mar ket re forms, sup -
port ing small and mid-size busi nesses, en sur ing pri vate prop erty own -
er ship. In other words, in the eco nomic sphere, he sup ports mar ket re -
forms; in the po lit i cal sphere, he im ple ments dem o cratic trans for ma -
tions (he won’t aban don ori ent ing on West ern life style, won’t limit free -
dom of the press, won’t ban civil dis obe di ence, etc.).
P.SYMONENKO PROGRAM’S IMAGE. From the above data, it is clear
that we mean the left leader. The ten dency to at trib ute Symonenko not
only the in ten tions to in crease the qual ity of life and to in crease the
strug gle with crimes and cor rup tion, but also those to re store the state
con trol over the prices, to aban don im i tat ing the West ern life style, etc.,
shows that. One thing’s for sure: vot ers can not clearly un der stand (nei -
ther it is ex plained to them!) what are con tem po rary com mu nist ideas.
In deed, they deal with ban ning pri vat iza tion, re fus ing to ac cept West ern
fi nan cial sup port, im ple ment ing dras tic mea sures, etc. Yet, only
10-12% of re spon dents gave such an swers. We did n’t ob serve a solid
unity of com mu nist ideas in terms of their fu ture de vel op ment. Prob a bly, 
this is the Achil les heel of the com mu nist leader try ing to avoid ex press -
ing spe cific com mu nist val ues that have been ‘ex pe ri enced’ al ready, but
voic ing the ne ces sity of com mu nist con trol over the gov ern ment. Of
course, it is not clear how ad van ta geous for com mu nists it is to ad ver tise 
their val ues; pub lic may or may not sup port them. This is a dif fer ent
prob lem, though; it is to be solved by P.Symonenko’s elec toral team and
im age-mak ers.
N.VITRENKO PROGRAM’S IMAGE. In N.Vitrenko’s case, we deal with
clear eclec ti cism. Her speeches give elec tor ate an idea that, on the one
hand, Natalija Mykhajlivna em pha sizes the need to in crease com mon
peo ple’s qual ity of life, to com bat cor rup tion, and to in crease pen sions;
on the other — to re sume the State con trol over the prices; and on yet an -
other — to con tinue rad i cal eco nomic re forms. More over, af ter hear ing
her pub lic state ments, peo ple be lieve that she will ac tively sup port sci -
ence and cul ture and will pay spe cial at ten tion to the prob lems of chil -
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dren and youth (let’s re mem ber V.Zhirinovsky mak ing such prom ises in
Rus sia sev eral years ago).
In for mu lat ing spe cific rec om men da tions on de sign ing our can di -
date’s elec toral pro gram, we were guided by the above and other data on
dem o crat i cally ori ented pres i den tial can di dates. 
‘In te gra tion or dis in te gra tion’. This prob lem which is solved when
an elec tion cam paign strat egy is be ing de vel oped con sists of clear ing
upon which cat e go ries of vot ers a can di date should pri mar ily rely dur ing 
his cam paign. There are two op tions:
a) a can di date can equally rely on all groups of po ten tial vot ers (in
terms of their po si tion in the so ci ety), or 
b) he can only rely on spe cific groups of vot ers that are most likely to
sup port him, that is, tar get voter groups must be se lected.
For the US, the ques tion was an swered by fa mous Amer i can so ci ol o -
gist G.Lipset; he proved that in sta ble so ci ety hav ing no so cial con flicts,
ei ther party or can di date may have sup port ers in all strata of so ci ety.
How ever, in times of so cial con flict, or se ri ous socio-eco nomic cri sis, a
can di date must ‘dis in te grate’ vot ers and ap peal to those so cial groups
whose in ter ests he can rep re sent the best.
The lat ter sit u a tion seems to be sim i lar to the one in con tem po rary
Ukrai nian so ci ety be fore the 1999 pres i den tial elec tions. Plus, pub lic
opin ion polls re sults show that main can di dates for a po si tion of the
Pres i dent of Ukraine en joy dif fer ent lev els of pub lic sup port in dif fer ent
re gions of the coun try (see Ta ble 4). (We will dis cuss this as pect in the
sec tion on dis tin guish ing tar get groups of vot ers for dif fer ent can di -
dates.)
‘The scale of pref er ences’. Es pe cially im por tant for choos ing an
elec tion cam paign’s stra te gic line (that later is to be spec i fied in ap pli ca -
tion to prin ci pal prob lems of the cam paign) is de ter min ing its key con -
tent as pects that de pend on a can di date’s ori en ta tion on ei ther main elec -
tor ate groups, or en tire elec tor ate. To do so, usu ally, the so-called ‘pref er -
ence scales’ are cre ated us ing the re sults of so cio log i cal re search (pub lic
opin ion polls, mon i tor ing). A gen eral con tent ‘pro file’ of the fu ture elec -
tion cam paign can be de signed by lo cat ing ideas and prob lems most in -
ter est ing for po ten tial vot ers on such ‘pref er ence scales’. Our stud ies
clar i fy ing the ‘na tional idea’, in which we an a lyzed its socio-eco nomic,
po lit i cal, and for eign pol icy as pects, showed what this con tent pro file is
like (see Fig ure 2).
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Ta ble 4
‘Elec toral Rat ing’ (readi ness to vote for a cer tain can di date): at ti tudes 
of dif fer ent pop u la tion groups to se lected pol i ti cians (% of re spon -
dents plan ning to vote in pres i den tial elec tions; July 1999)
Re spon dent groups Vitrenko Kuchma Symonenko Moroz Marchuk
To tal 19.5 20.5 16.2 6.7 5.2
Men 18.5 21.4 16.0 6.9 6.3
Women 20.4 19.8 16.4 6.6 4.4
18-29 years old 21.0 23.9 6.5 4.7 5.7
30-50 years old 20.5 20.7 13.3 6.8 5.9
50+ 17.6 18.5 24.7 7.8 4.3
Kyiv 16.0 32.1 5.7 13.2 6.6
North ern re gion 19.2 31.5 17.8 11.0 3.4
East Cen tral re gion 23.6 11.8 12.5 13.2 4.2
West Cen tral re gion 21.0 12.9 19.4 12.1 4.8
North-East ern re -
gion 24.7 9.7 20.1 3.2 2.6
North-West ern 
re gion 17.9 38.1 4.8 4.6 4.8
South-East ern 
re gion 26.1 14.4 24.5 3.7 3.2
South-West ern re -
gion 20.2 15.5 4.8 20.2 17.9
East ern re gion 19.9 13.5 30.6 4.6 1.4
West ern re gion 7.0 38.9 0.5 0.5 16.9
South re gion 22.3 22.3 11.4 4.0 1.7
Cri mea 12.2 13.4 22.0 1.2 2.4
The data shown in the fig ure was found by cal cu lat ing the av er age: a
po si tion ‘neg a tive’ rel a tively to the main course of his tor i cal prog ress had 
a value of 1 point; ‘pos i tive’ po si tion means 3 points, and a mid dle po si -
tion on the scheme had a value of 2 points.
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Fig ure 2. Con tent pro file of the 1999 Ukrai nian pres i den tial cam paign,
con cern ing dif fer ent as pects of na tional idea. 
The re sults of pub lic opin ion polls con ducted by the Cen ter “Socio -
polis” in April and July of 1999 show that in the pub lic con scious ness of
Ukrai nian pop u la tion (re sults var ied by re gions) the ‘na tional idea’ is for -
mu lated in the fol low ing way:
UKRAINE MUST BECOME A STATE THAT:
— CHOOSES A SOCIO-DEMOCRATIC COURSE OF DEVELOP -
MENT WITH A MARKET ECONOMY AND A DEMOCRATIC
POLITICAL SYSTEM THAT IS, HOWEVER, MORE SIMILAR TO
THE ‘IRON HAND REGIME’ THAN TO THE WESTERN POLITICAL
SYSTEM.
— CHOOSES TO DEVELOP INDEPENDENTLY, BUT WITH A MORE
PROMINENT ‘EASTERN’ ORIENTATION, TO SOME EXTENT.
Of course, this is only an av er age pro file, but it shows the av er age
state of ‘na tional idea’ in the coun try where dif fer ent re gions are of ten
char ac ter ized by rad i cally op po site eco nom i cal, so cial, and po lit i cal at ti -
tudes. In the West ern re gion, one can ob serve the fol low ing at ti tudes:
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Ukraine must be come a state with a free mar ket econ omy and West -
ern-like dem o cratic sys tem ori ented at Eu ro pean in te gra tion. In Cri -
mea, pub lic opin ion was prac ti cally unan i mous. Cri mean study yielded
the fol low ing pro file of ‘na tional idea’: Ukraine must go back to the so -
cial ist econ omy; it must cre ate a po lit i cal sys tem sim i lar to the So viet
one and must be ori ented on in te gra tion with Rus sia. As for other re -
gions, the ‘na tional idea’ else where fluc tu ates in the de scribed lim its.
De ter mining a key prob lem
of an elec tion cam paign
There are na tional and for eign pre ce dents show ing that some can di -
date can win by sim ply ven ti lat ing his at ti tude to a sin gle spe cific prob -
lem. This is likely to hap pen in lo cal elec tions in such dis tricts where
pop u la tion can con cen trate on spe cific ur gent lo cal prob lems. In pres i -
den tial elec tions, such sit u a tion is un likely, al though it is known that
the last elec tion cam paign of B.Yeltsin prac ti cally con sisted of one prob -
lem — the need to pre vent Rus sia from go ing back to so cial ism.
Dif fer ent stud ies prove that the main prob lem of the 1999 cam paign
was bound to stem from the socio-eco nomic sit u a tion in Ukraine. To day,
the slo gans of re vival of the So viet Un ion will not stir en thu si asm in peo -
ple; nei ther will a call for ‘bring ing the coun try to an or der’, un like it was
five years ago. Clearly, in elec tions, these el e ments can play trather sub -
or di nate role.
Studies con ducted by the Cen ter “Sociopolis” en abled us to ver ify the
ac cu racy of this as sump tion by cre at ing a model of po lit i cal-se man tic
field of Ukrai nian so ci ety be fore the 1999 elec tions (see Fig ure 3).
On one axis of the co or di nate sys tem, there are val ues of pub lic opin -
ion in dex of the ‘re form vs. anti-re form at ti tudes’ is sue; the other axis
shows the in dex of the is sue of ‘na tional vs. in ter na tional at ti tudes’ (‘in -
ter na tional at ti tudes’ re fer to peo ple’s will ing to see Ukraine hav ing
closer ties with Rus sia and Belarus; ‘na tional at ti tudes’ mean multi-vec -
tor pol i tics and in de pend ence).
A place ev ery re gion of Ukraine oc cu pies on this scheme was cal cu -
lated in the fol low ing way: plac ing re gions on the co or di nate sys tem was
based on re spon dents’ an swers to two ques tions de ter min ing socio-na -
tional typology: ‘na tional and free mar ket’ an swers were as signed pos i -
tive value; in ter na tional and so cial ist an swers — neg a tive value. To place
a re gion on the co or di nate sys tem we added per cent age val ues re lated to
each al ter na tive.
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Fig ure 3. Po si tions of re spon dents in dif fer ent re gions of the coun try — a model of
po lit i cal-se man tic field of Ukrai nian so ci ety be fore the 1999 pres i den tial elec tions.
For ex am ple: 40% of re gion A re spon dents stated that the most prom -
is ing course of de vel op ment con sists in get ting closer to Rus sia and the
Un ion of In de pend ent Na tions (in ter na tional course) and 20% named in -
de pend ence as the most prom is ing course. We sub tract 20% from 40%
and as sign a neg a tive value to the re sult ing ‘in ter na tion al ist’ po si tion.
There fore, re gion A is placed at –20 on the ver ti cal axis.
As we see, in most re gions, the prob lem of ‘res ur rect ing’ the So viet
Un ion is not on the first place any more. There are, how ever, re gions
where this is the case. At the same time, in other re gions, a clear sup port
for free mar ket and for ti fy ing the na tional in de pend ence can be ob -
served. It is note wor thy that the sup port of na tional in de pend ence (see
the up per left sec tion on the scheme) does n’t ever go hand-in-hand with
anti-re form at ti tudes in any re gions.
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Thus, it is nec es sary to un der stand whether a ‘dual’ key prob lem can
be used in ei ther elec tion cam paign. Can we talk about multi-vec tor pol i -
tics and for ti fy ing the na tional in de pend ence in the West, while prop a -
gat ing a un ion with Rus sia and Belarus in the East? We be lieve such ac -
tions to be point less (elec tion cam paigns of the past sup port this state -
ment): choos ing this course would have neg a tive con se quences and, in
the end, would re sult in fail ure. There fore, there should be only one key
prob lem in ei ther elec tion cam paign, al though ad di tional de tails may be
in tro duced on dif fer ent stages of the cam paign. Key prob lem must be
‘broad’ enough to ‘sat isfy’ the all re gions of Ukraine. Be cause a prob lem
is al ways for mu lated as a pres ence of some con tro versy that can be
solved in a pro posed way, the key prob lem of the pres i den tial cam paign
can be for mu lated like this:
IN TODAY’S COMPLICATED SOCIAL SITUATION, TO STRIVE FOR
REALIZATION OF ‘THE UKRAINIAN MIRACLE IDEA’, THAT IS, TO
BUILD AN EFFECTIVE ECONOMY AND TO ENSURE AN EFFECTIVE
SYSTEM OF SOCIAL PROTECTION FOR EVERY MEMBER OF SOCIETY, 
WHILE TAKING UKRAINIAN PEOPLE’S MENTALITY INTO ACCOUNT.
What can the ‘Ukrai nian mir a cle’ be like? Prob a bly, a per son ready to
be quite pre cise an swer ing this ques tion, could be sure enough in suc -
cess. For mu lating this prob lem and break ing it down in a can di date’s
elec toral pro gram are the main func tions of a can di date’s head quar ters
and ad vi sors dur ing the fi nal stages of de vel op ing an elec tion cam paign
strat egy.
For our part, we’ll com ment on ‘men tal ity ori en ta tion’ of the con tent of 
this prob lem. Nat u rally, it’s very ver sa tile and in cludes such prob lems as 
econ omy, at ti tude to gov ern ment, work, fam ily, etc. Still, as we have al -
ready noted, the main part of an elec tion cam paign strat egy is its socio-
 eco nomic as pect. Now, we’ll ex press our opin ion based on re sults of
 numerous stud ies of how Ukrai ni ans solve the prob lem of ‘wealth and
pov erty’.
No doubt, in solv ing this prob lem, Ukrai ni ans are dif fer ent not only
from West ern peo ples who pro fess Prot es tant ism and Ca thol i cism (say,
Czechs and Poles), but also from Rus sians and Belarussians. This men -
tal ity goes back to Or tho dox faith, was af fected by so cial ism, and has
some ethnical spec i fic ity. In our opin ion, Belarussians tend to prop a gate 
pov erty or, at least, to ac cept it. For Rus sians, this is not a num ber one
prob lem at all; all Rus sians want to be the ‘great’ na tion, to make NATO
re mem ber about them while bom bard ing Yu go sla via, etc. As for Ukrai ni -
ans, it seems that we have a fol low ing ste reo type: “IF WE ARE NOT TO BE 
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RICH, WE ARE TO LIVE WITH DIG NITY”. That is, on the one hand, pov -
erty is not ac cepted, and on the other — we pro fess the idea that wealth is
‘moral’, etc. For an out side ob server, it all ap pears rather un clear and in -
com pre hen si ble. How ever, if we re mem ber the prin ci ples of Or tho dox
busi ness eth ics based on the ideas of Volodymyr Monomakh, we’ll re al -
ize that to day’ Ukrai nian men tal ity very much cor re sponds to the at ti -
tude to ward the ‘wealth-pov erty’ prob lem, for mu lated in those prin ci -
ples. The most im por tant of them are:
— main eco nomic cat e go ries (pov erty, wealth, in come) are as sessed
from the stand point of how righ teous are their or i gins and us age;
— eco nomic ac tiv ity of any busi ness man must be so cially use ful,
that is, he must work not only for him self, but also for the so ci ety
(coun try side, city);
— an Or tho dox per son’s vir tue is not only a way to save one’s soul,
but also a cri te rion of so cial ef fec tive ness of econ omy;
— in the sphere of econ omy, there must be a work ing prin ci ple of
non-strict prof it abil ity of mar ket ex change, that is, it is un ac cept -
able to make prof its in just any way and by us ing just any meth ods
(‘profit above all, but dig nity above profit’).
Most likely, the com bi na tion of socio-dem o cratic prin ci ples of so cial
de vel op ment, ac cepted by Ukrai nian peo ple (these prin ci ples sup port
not only mar ket econ omy, but also firm so cial pol icy and so cial pro tec -
tion of pop u la tion) and Ukrai nian men tal ity, can show what a Ukrai nian
course of de vel op ment should be, tak ing into ac count the course that
Ukrai nian elec tor ate has ap proved to a max i mum ex tent when en ter ing
elec tion booths. We’d like to em pha size that the ap proach we pro posed is 
not the only op tion; on the other hand, any sim i lar ap proach must be
‘de vel oped’ in spe cific pro gram doc u ments of ei ther can di date.
Apart from the main pro gram of a pres i den tial cam paign, oth ers can
be in tro duced, too (al though, there should n’t be too much of them, be -
cause they may con fuse a com mon voter). Since in Oc to ber, 1999 pres i -
den tial elec tions, four ‘se ri ous’ left can di dates were to com pete against a
dem o crat i cally ori ented can di date, the word ing of an ad di tional prob lem 
of an elec tion cam paign, which is now socio-po lit i cal, rather than
socio-eco nom i cal, was to be as fol lows:
VOTE OR LOSE!
Cer tainly, in such a way de tailed prob lem was more ap pro pri ate for
the sec ond round of elec tions, in which a dem o cratic can di date has
faced one of the left can di dates, P.Symonenko. It was rea son able to use
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the above slo gan to re sist the ‘Red Threat’. On the one hand, it def i nitely
gave the can di date some ad van tages, since a con sid er able (and most im -
por tantly, so cially ac tive) part of elec tor ate has a neg a tive at ti tude as to
re new ing so cial ism. How ever, we should re mem ber that, un like the Rus -
sian pop u la tion, that of Ukraine is more con ser va tive (con se quently, it is
more ori ented on ad van tages of so cial ism, if not so cial ism per se) and
pays close at ten tion to the econ omy. El e ments op pos ing the so cial ist
course should be used only when nec es sary for pre vent ing an in crease
in pop u lar ity of left can di dates.
Goal and tasks of an elec tion cam paign
When a key prob lem is cho sen, the next step in de sign ing an elec tion
cam paign strat egy is to state the main goal and the most im por tant
tasks. The main goal of any elec tion cam paign is se cur ing a vic tory for a
spe cific can di date. Yet, we must de cide how to achieve a vic tory and what 
elec toral re sources are avail able; what tasks must a can di date and his
team per form in this pro cess.
In our opin ion, for ev ery dem o cratic can di date, the goal of 1999 elec -
tion cam paign con sisted of three is sues:
Pri marily, a high voter turn out ought to be se cured. In other words,
a dem o cratic can di date had to ap peal to his tar get voter groups, that is,
he did not make any ef forts to se cure max i mum turn out in those re gions
where he did not en joy se ri ous sup port, but ought to se cure an op ti mal
voter turn out in those re gions (pri mar ily West ern) that re ally sup ported
him.
The sec ond is sue was to strive for an elec toral sit u a tion when a
dem o cratic can di date would face the weak est of his po ten tial left
op po nents in the sec ond round of pres i den tial elec tions.
The third is sue was to en sure that the dem o cratic can di date
could get ahead of his op po nent by any num ber of votes in the sec -
ond round of the elec tions.
To achieve these goals, the fol low ing spe cific elec tion cam paign tasks
were to be per formed:
— pro duc ing an op ti mal struc ture of con duct ing an elec tion cam -
paign (such op ti mal struc ture can be based on cer tain po lit i cal
par ties and civic groups sup port ing the can di date, as well as ef fec -
tive PR cen ters that con trol the ef fec tive ness of the course of elec -
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tion cam paign and give rec om men da tions on ad just ments that
should be made);
— con duct ing an ef fec tive nom i na tion and gath er ing sig na tures
cam paign (the can di date’s ad ver tis ing and prop a gat ing his im age
and pro gram is to be gin on the sig na ture gath er ing stage);
— cre at ing a mem o ra ble pic ture of a can di date who is quite op ti mis -
tic about the fu ture and rep re sents pro gres sive dem o cratic forces
op pos ing a bunch of re ac tion ar ies that want Ukraine to go back to
the past, but are un able to unite due to their per sonal am bi tions;
— de vel op ing an ef fec tive sys tem of co op er a tion with ‘par al lel’ can di -
dates, that is, those who would urge their sup port ers to vote for
our pres i den tial can di date in the sec ond round;
— in the pro cess of or ga niz ing an elec tion cam paign, de vel op ing and
an a lyz ing clear and ef fec tive sys tems of pro pa ganda and neg a tive
ad ver tis ing, etc.
Re veal ing and us ing tar get voter groups
in the course of elec tion cam paign
The most im por tant part in de vel op ing an elec tion cam paign strat egy
is search ing, re veal ing, and ac tively us ing tar get voter groups. Such tar -
get groups con sist of cit i zens ready to vote for a set of prin ci ples and per -
sonal qual i ties that a cer tain can di date rep re sents. An elec tion cam -
paign should be pri mar ily di rected at these groups, be cause they:
— abare the frame work of all can di date’s sup port ers;
— abare the main force in con duct ing pro pa ganda and neg a tive ad -
ver tis ing dur ing an elec tion cam paign;
— abaffect un de cided vot ers (by the ‘spi ral of si lence’ phe nom e non or 
by open ad ver tis ing).
Also, it is nec es sary to re veal po ten tial tar get groups of other can di -
dates and ei ther ‘con tain’ them in their ‘so cial niches’ or use them, con -
vince them, and con vert them into one’s own sup port ers. In Ukraine and
all around the world, three ways of us ing tar get groups are known:
— ap peal ing to one’s own sup port ers;
— ap peal ing to other can di date’s sup port ers;
— appealing to hes i tant vot ers.
We won’t an a lyze pos si bil i ties and ad van tages of these three strat e -
gies in de tails. Let’s just say that na tional ex pe ri ence and our own stud -
ies and tech nol o gies have shown us that, dur ing 1999 pres i den tial elec -
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tion cam paign, it was rea son able to con cen trate on work ing with ‘one’s
own’ groups, that is, re vealed tar get groups [3].
This is how it’s done: first, a can di date’s elec tion cam paign head -
quar ters an a lyze the in ten sity of pub lic sup port of all can di dates in dif -
fer ent pop u la tion groups in dif fer ent re gions of the coun try (see Ta ble 4).
Sec ondly, they an a lyze lev els of po ten tial ac tiv ity of dif fer ent pop u la tion
groups and of elec tor ate in dif fer ent re gions on the up com ing elec tions
(see Ta ble 5). Next, they come up with dif fer ent types of vot ers and an a -
lyze how likely they are to sup port spe cific can di dates (see Fig ure 4).
Only af ter these steps are taken, we can stim u late (or sup press) the elec -
toral ac tiv ity of var i ous types of vot ers. Here, we of fer a short de scrip tion
of the elec tor ate of two lead ing (as vot ers’ in ten tions have shown) dem o -
cratic can di dates; the de scrip tion is based on our stud ies.
Ta ble 5
Ukrai nian cit i zens’ plans con cern ing par tic i pa tion in 1999 
pres i den tial elec tions; % of re spon dents
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To tal 69 12 19 70 9 21 73 7 20
Men 70 12 18 73 9 18 74 6 20
Women 67 13 20 68 9 23 72 8 20
17(18)-
29 years
old
65 14 21 65 9 26 66 9 25
30-50
years old 68 13 19 72 10 18 72 8 20
50+ 71 11 18 71 8 21 78 5 17
Kyiv 66 15 19 68 4 28 81 8 11
North ern
re gion 75 12 13 70 7 23 67 4 29
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East
Cen tral
re gion
76 15 9 77 7 16 69 7 24
West
Cen tral
re gion
67 13 20 77 11 12 78 8 14
North-
East ern
re gion
83 8 9 72 11 17 68 10 22
North-
West ern
re gion
79 8 13 76 12 12 86 4 10
South-
East ern
re gion
68 9 23 61 11 28 63 10 27
South-
West ern
re gion
75 18 7 60 14 26 77 12 11
East ern
re gion 61 11 28 77 5 18 75 6 19
West ern
re gion 71 11 18 73 11 16 76 6 18
South ern 
re gion 70 18 12 61 15 24 77 3 20
Cri mea 50 5 45 68 2 30 65 8 27
Note: The word ing of the ques tion was: “Would you vote if pres i den tial elec tions were con -
ducted next week?”
L.Kuchma’s elec tor ate was mostly lo cated in West ern re gions, in Kyiv
and Dnipropetrovsk ob lasts, in a num ber of north ern ob lasts (say,
Chernihiv); and mainly in coun try side. We can as sume that his elec tor -
ate con sisted of tra di tion ally con ser va tive layer of pop u la tion ad vo cat ing 
Ukrai nian in de pend ence, those who be lieved that pres i dent should n’t
change the pres ent po lit i cal course, be cause any new po lit i cal course (in
their opin ion) will de te ri o rate the sit u a tion in the coun try. Al most a third
of the in cum bent Pres i dent’s po ten tial elec tor ate (more than that of any
other ‘se ri ous’ can di date) con sisted of youth.
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Fig ure 4. Typology and size of elec tor ate groups hav ing dif fer ent mo ti va tions in reach ing
de ci sion on par tic i pa tion in the elec tions (% from those re spon dents who are likely to vote
in pres i den tial elec tions).
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‘’SWAMP’ Those who are voting but are
unable to identify the reasons why they vote
‘TRADITIONALISTS’ Those who are voting
from force of habit like all friends and
relatives, because they used to go to the
polling place
‘COWARDS’ Those who are voting because
they want to avoid troubles with local
authorities, members of election committee
‘OBSERVERS’ Those who are taking part in
elections because they have an interest to
see who will be winner
‘PROTESTANTS’ Those who are voting in
order to prevent the power access to
somebody they do not trust
‘VOTERS’ Those who are voting in order to
support a trustworthy candidate
‘POLITICIANS’ Those who are voting in order
to demonstrate their agreement (or
disagreement) with current policy and to
influence on situation
‘CITIZENS’ Those who are voting because
consider participation in the elections as a
civic duty
july, 1999 ã. april, 1999 ã. december, 1998 ã.
The Pres i dent en joys lit tle sup port in the Cen tral and East ern re gions
(Donetsk and Luhansk ob lasts) and es pe cially in the North-East ern one
(Sumy and Kharkiv ob lasts). In ter est ingly, that dur ing last few months
be fore elec tions, there was ob served a sub stan tial in crease in num ber of
his sup port ers in the South ern re gion (Mykolayiv, Odesa, and Kherson
ob lasts); half a year pre vi ously, this was n’t the case. In com par i son with
other can di dates, among the sup port ers of L.Kuchma, there were many
re form ad vo cates: 63% sup ported re forms and 23% were against them
(only Ye.Marchuk had more re form ad vo cates among his sup port ers —
73% vs. 13%), as well as those be liev ing that Ukraine must be po lit i cally
ori ented on West ern dem o cratic val ues.
Ye.Marchuk, an other dem o cratic can di date, en joyed much less sup -
port. His elec tor ate was mostly lo cated in the South-West ern re gion of
the coun try (Ternopil and Khmelnitsky ob lasts). He had some sup port -
ers in Kyiv, too. Among his sup port ers, there were many peo ple with
post-sec ond ary de grees (37%). In the West, he was con sid ered to be na -
tion al ist, in the East — a so cial dem o crat; this fact cre ated a pos si bil ity
of an un de sir able ‘clash’ of these two im ages. As we’ve al ready noted,
Ye.Marchuk’s sup port ers were the most re form-ori ented (even more
than those of the in cum bent Pres i dent). In his elec tor ate, a pro por tion of
vot ers sup port ing and op pos ing de moc racy was sim i lar to that of
L.Kuchma; how ever, a con sid er able num ber of Ye.Marchuk’s sup port ers 
would like to see an ‘iron hand re gime’ (sim i lar to the re gime of Pinochet),
al though the ma jor ity of his elec tor ate had dem o cratic at ti tudes.
Shortly, these were char ac ter is tics of the ma jor ity of sup port ers of two 
main dem o cratic can di dates in 1999 Ukrai nian pres i den tial elec tions.
Their elec tor ates were rather sim i lar, what was a mat ter in the sec ond
round of elec tions, when one of them, as we know, have got there. Our
stud ies also yielded in ter est ing data on dif fer ences be tween O.Moroz,
P.Symonenko, and N.Vitrenko sup port ers, but in this ar ti cle, we won’t
of fer such anal y sis, al though it is def i nitely help ful for de sign ing an elec -
tion cam paign stra te gic plan, for re veal ing the specificities of op po nents
of dem o cratic can di dates, and for stra te gic and tac ti cal plan ning of op -
pos ing them in elec tions.
* * *
As we fin ish our dis cus sion of some prob lems of de sign ing a pres i -
den tial elec tion cam paign strat egy, we’d like to re mind you that, for a
num ber of rea sons, in this ar ti cle, we did n’t re veal all el e ments of the
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strat egy we pre pared; nei ther we dis cussed in de tail its most im por tant
ex clu sive spe cif ics. Also, this strat egy is not iden ti cal to spe cific pro gram 
doc u ments avail able to pub lic, be cause it shows all prob lems of elec tion
cam paign or ga ni za tion, in clud ing ‘closed’ ones, like the in struc tions to
elec tion head quar ters and de scrip tion of pro pa ganda and neg a tive ad -
ver tis ing strat e gies.
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